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ARTICLES
A HYBRID MODEL OF SELF-REGULATION AND
GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION OF
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE
Timothy D. Casey and Jeff Magenau t
I. INTRODUCTION
The world is rapidly moving towards an age of ubiquitous
globally networked communications; not just communications
between and among persons, but also between the electronic devices
that serve them; not just between particular government leaders, but
among the vast databases and other sources of information upon
which regulatory regimes depend; and not just between parties to a
transaction, but among the instruments of entire economies.
Eventually, terms such as "e-commerce" will become
meaningless distinctions-just as we would not today refer to
business conducted over the telephone as "telephone commerce." As
communications and commerce and inter-governmental regulatory
and law enforcement efforts conducted over networks become
commonplace, the notion that government has no role to play will
begin to fade. Just as the "Wild, Wild, West" of 19 th century America
eventually needed a sheriff to establish order, secure the people's
safety, and foster predictability for business, so too will the idea of a
"lawless" Internet-upon which the networked communications at
issue here are currently and may always be based-seem in retrospect
a shortsighted and naive concept.
t Tim Casey is a partner and Jeff Magenau is an associate in the Intellectual Property
Technology Transactions and Services practice group at Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver &
Jacobson in Washington, D.C. and New York, N.Y. We are grateful to several associates and
law clerks at Fried Frank who conducted virtually all of the research for and prepared early
drafts of this article. In particular, we would like to thank Andrew Olek, Angela Angelovska-
Wilson, Kimberly Wade, and Jane Reynolds.
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Having said that, the characteristics of the Internet and other data
networks, such as their architectures, render them uniquely resistant
or ill-suited to the wholesale application of existing rules and
regulations. For one thing, such networks scale to virtually limitless
proportions; the space of "cyberspace" is essentially infinite. As
such, limited resources, a driving force behind many regulatory
regimes, is effectively inapplicable. For another thing, the lack of a
significant, more-or-less permanent physical presence-or at least the
widely distributed "locations" of content and activity on data
networks (e.g., computer hard drives and servers)-raises
fundamental, perhaps insurmountable difficulties for the traditional
application of jurisdictional principles and enforcement mechanisms.
This article argues that in order to foster business certainty,
service providers need to continue investing in network infrastructure
and applications, and that a global legal regime that harmonizes the
imposition of civil and criminal liability is required. Under existing
laws, the "facilitators" of criminal or injurious activity engaged in by
others may be held indirectly responsible for such activity in certain
situations. As illegal or harmful content or activity moves to data
networks (hereinafter referred to as the "Internet"), the difficulty in
identifying and accessing the actual perpetrators of criminal or
injurious activity gives rise to calls from governments, intellectual
property owners, victims of crimes and others to hold Internet service
providers responsible for the infringement of the rights of others. The
unapologetic aim of placing such a burden on service providers is to
encourage them to stop, or control, the illicit activity.
We argue that, in fact, the imposition of overly burdensome
regulation or legal liability will instead encourage service providers to
reduce investment in infrastructure and new services, or charge more
for the services they do provide. Nevertheless, we feel-and recent
history supports the notion-that a certain level of regulation and
legal liability for acts of third parties is inevitable for service
providers.t Thus, a regime in which service providers and others
know the ground rules, and which largely leaves procedural
implementation of legal requirements to service providers, can foster
an environment which provides business certainty and remedies for
injured parties that is acceptable to all. The service provider liability
I. Among the U.S. laws that to some extent impose and/or qualify liability on Internet
service providers are the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, the Children's Online
Privacy Protection Act and the Child Online Protection Act.
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provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998
("DMCA") 2 have generally been successful in this respect.
We note that the elemental framework of the DMCA has found
its way to other proposed federal legislation dealing with service
provider liability in the U.S. Congress and in the European Union's
regulatory bodies. With that as a starting point, we argue that the
imposition of liability for service providers around the world should
be harmonized, to the extent possible, both with respect to jurisdiction
and type of content or activity.
In order to derive lessons from history and to develop workable
models by analogy, we first look at prior and current responses to the
development of other new technologies and assess the advantages and
drawbacks of those responses.
1I. RESPONSE TO OTHER NEW TECHNOLOGIES
Technological change has always been a source of problems that
the regulatory and judicial systems have had to address. The
development of the printing press, and the idea of education
becoming available for the populace, caused Queen Elizabeth to
establish the Stationers Charter in a largely successful effort to
regulate the dissemination of ideas. Rapid advancements in
technology elicited similar responses in the 1 9 th century. Faced with
a confusing array of new communication technologies, courts selected
analogies to resolve doubtful legal issues and to establish legal
treatment for each new technology. For example, the telegraph was
compared and analogized to prior methods of common carriage, and
the telephone thereafter compared to the telegraph. A century later
the technologies of the telephone, motion pictures and broadcast
media have been successfully integrated into the regulatory and legal
systems of the United States. In recent years, courts and regulators
have once again been faced with a similar challenge with respect to
the regulation of the Internet. The history of regulation of other
means of mass communications can offer valuable insight in
evaluating and integrating different approaches to regulating the
Internet.
2. See generally Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat.
2860 (1998).
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In 21"t century America, government regulation has become a
natural part of our daily lives and we seldom consider why the
government chooses to regulate certain industries. Different authors
have suggested different economic and social policy reasons for
government regulation of industry. They include consumer
protection, fear of natural monopoly, promotion of market
efficiencies, as well as equity and fairness.3
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876), is considered the
cornerstone of Supreme Court regulatory jurisprudence and, more
importantly, the beginning of modem economic regulation by the
government.4  In Munn, the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of an Illinois statute regulating the price charged by
grain elevators against a "takings" challenge. The Court held that a
state legislature could set prices charged by monopolies, especially
when the service was in the public interest.5
Consistent with the reasoning expressed by the Supreme Court in
Munn, Congress created the Interstate Commerce Commission
("ICC") in 1887 specifically for rate regulation of railroads.6
Railroads were considered a vital industry for the nation and railroad
transportation was in the public interest. The creation of the ICC
signaled a new era in the responsibilities of the federal government.
For the first time, regulation of a vital industry was committed to an
independent agency, an institutional mechanism that was untested on
a national level at that time.7  Since the formation of the ICC, the
forms and purposes of regulation have changed in response to
economic crises, emerging risks to public health and safety, and
technological advances.
The invention of the telephone by Alexander Graham Bell
marked a significant technological advancement for American
3. See generally SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, REGULATORY LAW AND
POLICY (2d ed. 1998) for a discussion and analysis of economic and social regulation.
4. Robert Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189,
1208 (1986); Harold Furchtgott-Roth, Before the Federalist Society, Telecommunications
Practice Group, Federalist Society National Convention (Nov. 12, 1998), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/FurchtgottRoth/sphfr818.txt.
5. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134-37 (1876), (Field, J., dissenting) (noting the
ambiguity of the Court's justification that when private property is 'affected with a public
interest' it is subject to regulatory control by the state, thereby creating an opening for
regulation of virtually any private enterprise in the future).
6. Joseph P. Tomain, American Regulatory Policy: Have We Found the "Third Way?"
Symposium Papers: networkingindustries.gov.reg, 48 U. KAN. L REV. 829, 833 (2000)
(discussing the creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission and rate regulation of
railroads).
7. Interstate Commerce Commission, Microsoft® Encarta® Online Encyclopedia 2000,
at http://encarta.msn.com, 0 1997-2000 Microsoft Corporation (last visited Aug. 1, 2002).
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commerce and society in general. Bell patented the telephone in
1876. 8 The expiration of Bell's basic patents in 1893 and 1894 was a
signal for open competition. The country experienced a boom in
formation of new local telephone operating companies; by the end of
the century there were approximately 6,000 providers offering service
to 600,000 subscribers.9  Unfortunately, there was no
interconnectedness among all these telephones and a subscriber
needed to have two or three instruments in order to communicate
effectively with others.' 0
The first sign of significant government involvement in the
telephone industry came in 1912, when the Justice Department filed
an antitrust suit against AT&T, which controlled all of the long
distance circuits and refused to interconnect any other telephone
company to its network." In response to the government threat of a
break up of the company, AT&T entered into an agreement that
would allow all other telephone companies to interconnect. 12 This
agreement became known as the Kingsbury Commitment. 13
By 1934, telecommunications had become so vital to the country
that Congress passed the Communications Act ("1934 Act"), and,
simultaneously, created the Federal Communications Commission
("FCC"). The 1934 Act created a regulatory system governing the
interstate portion of the communications industry. The FCC was
created "for the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign
commerce in communication by wire and radio so as to make viable,
so far as possible, to all the people of the United States a rapid,
efficient, nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication
service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges.' 4  The
regulation of the telephone common carrier was based on market
entry price controls, imposing a duty to furnish communication
services upon reasonable request. Subsequent anti-competition
challenges relating to AT&T's control of the local and long distance
8. Adam D. Thierer, Unnatural Monopoly: Critical Moments in the Development of the
Bell System Monopoly, 14 CATO J. 1,2 (1994).
9. The International Engineering Consortium, History and Regulation of the Telephone
Industry, at http://www.iec.org/tutorials/ftnd-telecom/topic01.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2002).
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. Thierer, supra note 8, at 272 ("AT&T would sell off its $30 million in Western Union
stock, agree not to acquire any other independent companies, and allow other competitors to
interconnect with the Bell System"). Id. at 272.
13. Thierer, supra note 8, at 272.
14. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1934)
(amended 1996).
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markets by the Department of Justice and MCI Communications
resulted in the break-up of AT&T in 1984 and created the regional
bell operating companies ("RBOCs"), including, Bell Atlantic, Bell
South, Ameritech, SouthWest Bell, Pacific Bell, and NYNEX.
Due to perceptions of inadequate competition in both the long
distance and local markets, the 1934 Act was overhauled in 1996.
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("1996 Act") created a massive
shift in the telecommunications industry, deregulating markets that
had been under government regulation since their inception. The
seven titles of the 1996 Act cover telecommunications services,
broadcast services, cable services, federal regulatory reform, obscene
and violent content, and miscellaneous issues ranging from radio
spectrum sales to the location of telephone poles. 15 Given the lack of
current competition in the local markets of the RBOCs only a few
years after its passing, the 1996 Act appears to have failed to achieve
its stated goals. 16
The histories of motion picture and broadcasting regulation offer
an interesting contrast of regulatory models. In particular, the motion
picture industry includes an early period of governmental regulation,
followed by industry self-regulation and voluntary ratings. In
contrast, the broadcast industry started out relatively self-regulated,
but quickly became regulated by the government.
The first regulations of the motion picture industry came from
local and state government licensing.' 7 Using local business licensing
laws, the state and local government regulated through the use of fees
and codes.' 8  In the early part of the 20 h century, states began to
institute government licensing schemes and prior review. This type
of regulation was upheld by the Supreme Court in Mutual Film
Corporation v. Industrial Commission of Ohio.19 In 1921, the state of
New York rejected the self-regulatory scheme proposed by the
15. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 2 tits. l-VII, 110 Stat. 56
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 336 (1996)), § 703, 110 Stat. 56 (1934) (current version at
47 U.S.C. § 224 (1996)).
16. See Jean F. Walker, Paved With Good Intentions: How InterLATA Data Relief
Undermines the Competitive Provisions of the 1996 Act, 53 FED. COMM. L.J. 533 (2001); James
K. Glassman, Telecom Act Five Years Later: Re-Monopolization? (2001), at
http://www.newsfactor.com/perl/story/7404.html (last visited October 10, 2002); Ken McGee,
The Telecom Act Spurs Little Competition, at http://news.com.com/2009-1033-
251952.html?legacy-cnet (last visited October 10, 2002).
17. See RICHARD S. RANDALL, CENSORSHIP OF THE MOVIES 13 (1968).
18. Id. at 11.
19. Mutual Film Corporation v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230, 242
(1915) (upholding of the pre-censorship of movies because "they may be used for evil, and
against that possibility the statute was enacted").
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National Board of Review and instituted its own state censorship
board. The motion picture industry reacted by creating the Motion
Picture Producers and Distributors of America, the industry
organization that eventually became the Motion Picture Association
of America.20  With time, the abuse of power by many state
censorship boards became obvious and the Supreme Court struck
down the state censorship and encouraged the industry to move
toward self-regulation and a ratings system.21  The state and local
governments in the 1960's began to seek different ways to inform
22consumers about movies through a formal rating system. These
early attempts at rating systems were struck down by the courts, and
the movie industry moved to introduce its own rating system in
1968 .23 This industry-imposed rating system governs the movie
industry today. The self-regulatory model has been subject to
numerous congressional attacks for failing to be strict enough and has
been revised numerous times. Similar models, subject to similar
criticism, have been accepted in other areas, such as the video game
industry.
The beginning of the 2 0 1h century saw an explosion in growth of
wire communication mediums as well. As with numerous other
technologies, there were no government regulations in the early
stages of radio and television development, ultimately leading to
considerable problems. The radio industry as a whole was threatened
because the airwaves were flooded with stations in the same
geographic territory broadcasting at the same frequencies, resulting in
multiple interference problems and causing stations to increase the
power of their signals to drown out competing signals.24
The Radio Act of 1927 ("1927 Act") created the five-member
Federal Radio Commission ("FRC") to solve the interference
problem. The original purpose of broadcast regulation was to ration
the use of public electromagnetic spectrum and to impose a public
service obligation so that the public interest and necessity would be
served. 25 The 1927 Act was insufficient in some areas to keep up
20. RANDALL, supra note 17, at 16.
21. See United States v. Paramount Pictures Inc., 334 U.S. 495 (1952); Burstyn v.
Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
22. STEPHEN FARBER, THE MOVIE RATING GAME (1972).
23. Id.
24. See JOHN WITHERSPOON AND ROSELLE KOVITZ, THE HISTORY OF PUBLIC
BROADCASTING (1989).
25. The Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 632, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927). The 1927 Act
also expressly gave radio First Amendment protection from censorship.
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with the demands of the communications industry, and in 1934,
Congress passed the Communications Act of 1934. The newly
formed FCC replaced the FRC and became the regulator of wire line
and wireless technologies.
In 1996 Congress signaled its policy choice of a regulation-free
zone for Internet, and information services and technologies through
the Telecommunications Act of 1996.26 Section 230 of the 1996 Act
is an explicit endorsement of market self-regulation of the Internet,
over government regulation. As a result, although the FCC maintains
that it has the discretion to regulate Internet infrastructure and
services-but has declined, so far, to do so2 7-it would currently be
difficult for it to assert such authority over the express wishes of
Congress.
In the area of taxation, Congress initially displayed opposition to
federal regulation of the Internet, but the strength of this sentiment
may be tested in the near future. The Internet Tax Freedom Act of
1998 ("ITFA") imposed a three-year moratorium on new federal,
state and local taxes on Internet access, and a three-year moratorium
on new federal taxes on services offered through the Internet. 28  The
ITFA, however, does not prohibit all state sales taxes on Internet
commerce and only postpones other difficult questions regarding
federal taxation of Internet commerce.2 9
26. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, supra note 15.
27. Beginning in the late 1960s, the FCC distinguished between so-called "basic" and
"enhanced" services for purposes of the imposition of government regulation. Since that time,
the FCC has consistently declined to regulate enhanced services, which include the types of
information services provided over the Internet. While many believe that the FCC was
expressly separating out services over which it had no regulatory authority, the agency has
maintained that it has always had the discretion to regulate such services, but chose not to do so
under an "infant industry" rationale-that the growth of the information services industry would
be hindered by intrusive and burdensome regulatory requirements. Now that the information
services industry is, by most accounts, a large and healthy one, some have argued that limited
regulation is appropriate. In addition, as the networks that carry enhanced information services
and the networks that carry basic telecommunications become increasingly indistinguishable-
and, in fact, share infrastructure, the FCC's time-honored distinction becomes less rational in its
current form. Two recent examples of challenges the FCC faces in this regard are (1) whether
and to what extent Internet telephony-ordinary voice calls carried over the Internet-should be
subject to telephone regulation; and (2) whether cable networks should be required to open their
systems to competitors seeking to provide broadband information services.
28. See Internet Tax Freedom Act of 1998, Publ. L. No. 105-277, 47 U.S.C. § 151
(1998); See also Christopher J. Schafer, Federal Legislation Regarding Taxation of Internet
Sales Transaction, 16 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 415 (2001); Jon Hart & Mike Hines, Taxing the
Internet: How Will Congress Interpret the Law?, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 2000, available at
http://interactive.wsj.com/articles/SB977006380777599628.htm.
29. See id
HYBRID MODEL OF SELF-REGULATION
In 2001, Congress extended the IFTA's moratorium on federal
Internet taxes another two years, to November 1, 2003 .30 During the
debate on the extension, the Senate rejected an amendment that would
have allowed states to collect sales taxes on each others' behalf-a
change favored by traditional retailers who believe their Internet
competitors have an unfair advantage, and by state and local
governments hoping to recoup $26 billion in uncollected taxes a
year.
31
By contrast, the European Union's approach represents not only
greater centralization but also an attempt at worldwide control. Under
an EU directive, on-line retailers-regardless of where in the world
they operate-will be required to assess value-added taxes on sales
made to EU customers, starting in July 2003.32 American officials
already have threatened to refer the issue to the World Trade
Organization ("WTO"), fearing that the EU's rules could discriminate
against non-EU companies and also serve to exclude them from the
EU market.33 Although the complexities of Internet taxation are
beyond the scope of this article, the subject exemplifies the difficult
questions raised by Internet commerce.
III. OTHER EFFORTS TO HARMONIZE LAWS
A. The Collision of Copyright Law and The Internet
In the view of many, the rise of the Internet posed a serious
threat to the function and effectiveness of copyright law.34 Even
though the Internet existed at the time the United States Copyright
Act was substantially amended in 1976, it was not considered a
medium that concerned copyright law at that time. The Internet
evolved as a global, distributed network of computers with no central
authority or control. As such, it has no boundaries as to countries and
30. Internet Tax Nondiscrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 107-75, 115 Stat. 703 (2001).
31. Nathaniel T. Trelease & Andrew W. Swain, Pandora's Box: Emerging Issues in the
Taxation of E-Commerce, CYBERSPACE LAW., February 2002, at 5; BBC NEWS, US Rejects E-
Tax Plan (November 16, 2001) at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/business/1659345.stm.
32. Council Directive 2002/38/EC 2002 O.J. I (L. 128); BBC NEWS, EU Imposes E-
Commerce Tax, (May 7, 2002), at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hilbusiness/1973390.stm.
33. See BBC NEWS, supra note 31.
34. See Scott Roland, Internet and Copyright, at
http://www.cs.appstate.edu/-jbf/classes/cs4100/s99/cr102/roland.html (last visited Oct. 14,
2002); Karen Coyle, Address at the San Francisco Public Library, at
http://www.kcoyle.net/sfpltalk.htmil (Aug. 7, 1996); Carol Morrissey, The 1996 WIPO Geneva
Conference: Friend or Foe?, at http://www.llrx.com/congress/010197.htm (last visited Oct. 14,
2002); Jack E. Brown, New Law of the Internet, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1243 (1996).
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continents, 35 and countries that claim a right to regulate the Internet
often have a difficult time effectively applying and enforcing their
copyright laws.36 The question often becomes what country's
copyright laws should apply to which defendants located where. As
of today, there is no governing body that has both international law-
making capabilities and the authority to enforce them.3 7
Internet service provider ("ISP") liability for copyright
infringement activities has been a difficult issue for the courts to
address.38 Although ISPs generally act as a conduit of information
passing through their systems, copyright law has held service
providers liable depending upon their degree of knowledge regarding
the infringing activity, or their benefit from the illegal content or
activity. 39 Owners of copyrights originally viewed any limitation on
copyright infringement liability for ISPs as a step in the wrong
direction. 40 They made several arguments against the establishment
of such limits, based on their concern that it would weaken copyright
enforcement over the Internet.4 1 For their part, the ISPs made the
argument that limitation on liability was necessary to prevent a flood
of lawsuits against the ISPs themselves, or against the customers of
the ISPs. 42 To many, the argument that the lack of protection from
on-line copyright infringement liability could weaken entrepreneurial
interest in the ISP industry did not ring true; between 1995 and 1997,
revenue from providing Internet access nearly quadrupled.43 It should
be pointed out, however, that during that same period, no court
handed down a decision holding ISPs strictly liable for copyright
infringement without facts showing direct infringement.
In opposing limitations on liability, some looked to the
publishing industry by analogy, and questioned why ISPs should be
35. See Roland, supra note 34.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See, Shelley M. Liberto, New Law Limits ISP Liability For Copyright Infringement,
ORANGE CoUNTY LAWYER, March 1999, at http://www.libertolaw.com/2-99.html; Lori E.
Lesser & Vincent M. de Grandpre, Courts Expand ISP Protection, But Pitfalls Remain: 2001 in
Review, CYBERSPACE LAW., January 2002, at 7; Hendrickson v. eBay, 165 F.Supp. 2d 1082
(C.D. Cal. 2001).
39. See, Liberto, supra note 38.
40. See Mark E. Harrington, Note, On-line Copyright Infringement Liability for Internet
Service Providers:Context, Cases & Recently Enacted Legislation, 1999 B.C. INTELL. PROP. &
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treated differently. 44 In their view, ISPs were essentially publishers,
albeit in a new forum. Many argued that ISPs should bear their share
of the burden like everyone else. 45 The argument was made that the
ISPs performed a unique and lucrative function for the Internet, were
uniquely positioned to help reduce copyright infringement by Internet
users, and therefore, individual ISPs should have a legal duty to help
decrease on-line piracy and a legal responsibility to monitor their
users for copyright infringement.46
B. Initial Response: The Administration's White Paper
The Clinton Administration began addressing the issue of on-
line copyright infringement during its first term.47 In February 1993,
it established the Information Infrastructure Task Force ("IITF").48
The IITF was to implement programs that would assist in the
development of what the Administration referred to as the National
Information Infrastructure ("Nil"), now generally called the
Internet.49 The Clinton Administration responded to complaints from
music, software, and movie (collectively, "content") companies in
1995 by proposing legislation as part of a white paper report entitled
Intellectual Property and the National Information Infrastructure,
known in the industry as the "White Paper., 50  The White Paper
addressed many topics including encryption, digital signatures, and
on-line copyright management information, in addition to outlining
the Administration's policy regarding the issue of on-line copyright
infringement liability for ISPs. 51 The proposed legislation was never
adopted, however, due to concerns raised by ISPs and a number of
other entities. Subsequent attempts were likewise unsuccessful, until
the basic concepts of the White Paper were incorporated into draft
treaties being considered by the World Intellectual Property
Organization ("WIPO") in 1996.52
44. See id
45. See Roland, supra note 34; see also Hal R. Varian & Pamela Samuelson, Information
Policy in the Clinton Years (American Economic Policy in the 1990s), May 30, 2001, available
at
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/cbg/Conferences/economic-policy/SAMUELSON-VARIAN.pdf




50. TIMOTHY D. CASEY, ISP LIABILITY SURVIVAL GUIDE 100 (2000).
51. See Harrington, supra note 40.
52. See Morrissey, supra note 34.
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C. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA ")
By the time the WIPO treaties were presented to the United
States for ratification, 53 members of Congress had begun to
understand the intricacies of the ISP liability issue and had agreed that
the treaties needed to be implemented 4  This led to negotiation
sessions between major copyright owners and communications
companies.55 The outcome of all of this work was Title II of the
DMCA, which was signed into law in the United States in October,
1998.56 This legislation accomplished three main objectives: 1)
codified into statutory law the rule that passive automatic acts cannot
be the foundation for a finding of on-line copyright infringement; 2)
made it harder to establish a case of contributory or vicarious
copyright infringement against an ISP; and 3) in cases where ISPs
take action against alleged copyright violators, protected ISPs from
lawsuits when they acted to aid copyright owners in restricting or
impeding infringement.5 7 The law does not establish an unqualified
exemption to copyright infringement liability;58 it is a restriction on
liability, and the restriction takes the form of a statutory change in the
remedies that the plaintiff has available, rather than by establishing a
legal exemption to copyright infringement liability. 59
The DMCA provides that a service provider shall not be liable
for copyright infringement caused by the storage at the direction of a
user of material that is on a system or network controlled or operated
by or for the service provider, if the service provider: 1) does not have
knowledge that the material is infringing, is not aware of facts or
circumstances from which the infringing activity is apparent, or after
being made aware of such facts or circumstances, acts expeditiously
to remove or disable access to the material; 2) does not receive a
financial benefit directly related to the infringing activity in a case
where the service provider has the right and ability to control the
53. Principally, the Copyright Treaty, adopted by WIPO on December 20, 1996. This
treaty responded to a widely-held belief that the copyright laws of many countries inadequately
addressed the issues raised by the digital distribution of works over computer networks. The
treaty's preamble "[r]ecogniz[es] the profound impact of the development and convergence of
information and communication technologies on the creation and use of literary and artistic
work." See Morrissey, supra note 34.
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activity; and 3) upon notice of infringement, expeditiously removes or
disables access to the allegedly infringing material.6 °
Title II of the DMCA was the first law specifically written to
address the liability of on-line service providers, and it has formed the
basis for many of the laws that have followed and will unquestionably
influence the world's legal direction on this issue long into the
future. 6 It generally limits liability of Internet service providers for a
range of activities including transitory digital network
communications, system caching, referring or linking users to sites
containing infringing materials, and the storage of copyright
infringing material on their systems.62 Prior to the DMCA, ISPs were
potentially liable for direct and contributory infringement attributable
to their own actions, as well as subject to vicarious liability for the
acts of subscribers who were directly infringing.63
The DMCA specifically provides that nothing in the statute
should be construed to condition its protections on monitoring a
service or pursuing facts indicating infringing activity unless pursuant
to a standard technical measure.64 The DMCA also provides that ISPs
are not obligated to gain access to, remove, or disable access to
material in cases where doing so would be forbidden by law. 65 The
legislation is not intended to discourage service providers from
monitoring their services for infringing material; however, in
deference to privacy concerns, ISPs are specifically not required to
monitor.
The service provider liability provisions of the DMCA amount to
a compromise between what can generally be classified as the content
industry and ISPs. In the end, the major content owners-movie
studios, record labels, and others-compromised on their initial
insistence that ISPs be subject to liability for the infringements of
their customers or other users of their networks, and ISPs
compromised on their initial insistence that ISPs be wholly exempt
from such liability. What this compromise offers is some recourse
60. Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii) (2002).
61. CASEY, supra note 50, at 17.
62. See Jason M. Anderman & Mauricio F. Paez, Digital Music and the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act: Copyright Piracy, Liability and Licensing, MP3.cOM, available at
http://www.mp3.com/news/267.html (last visited October 14, 2002); Digital Millennium
Copyright Act of 1998, 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)-(d) (2002); Lesser & de Grandpre, supra note 38.
63. See Anderman & Paez, supra note 62.
64. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, 17 U.S.C. § 12(m); CASEY, supra
note 50, at 117.
65. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, supra note 64.
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and some protection for both sides. In addition, and perhaps most
importantly, it offers greater predictability for both industries at a
time when fast-changing technologies, markets, and business methods
are forcing companies to turn on a dime and often "bet the ranch" on
their next move.
Although it is difficult to predict how each industry's current
business decision might be different had the DMCA greatly favored
one side or the other, we note that both industries are investing with
abandon in new technologies and in new ways of doing business. We
believe that the thoroughly debated, well-balanced outcome of the
DMCA's service provider liability provisions serve as a powerful
example of a workable solution to what once seemed like an
insurmountable problem.
IV. HARMONIZED INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT FRAMEWORK
As of this writing, even though the EU has adopted a Directive
"on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular
electronic commerce, in the Internal Market" ("E-Commerce
Directive") 66 that limits the liability of ISPs, the EU is considering
legislation 67 that could make service providers liable for unauthorized
copies of protected works made as part of an automated process in
routers and cache servers solely for the purpose of efficient network
transmission. Shortly after the EU adopted its E-Commerce Directive
in 2000, it issued a directive on harmonizing copyright laws. 68 This
copyright directive includes a specific exemption from liability for
copyright infringement for "temporary reproduction" that occurs
during network transmission and that has no separate economic value.
The exemption protects ISPs from liability for the copying that occurs
during automated routing and caching processes on their servers,69
provided the ISPs meet certain conditions including, when necessary,
taking certain actions to prevent or discourage infringing activities.
70
These conditions may include the requirement that ISPs remove or
prevent the transmission of data that copyright owners claim infringe
their works. In many cases, however, such temporary copies occur so
66. Council Directive 2000/31/EC, 2000 O.J. (L 178).
67. Council Directive 2001/29/EC, 2001 O.J. (L 178).
68. See id.
69. See id art. 5.1; SCADPIus, Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society,
available at http://europa.eu/int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/126053.htm (last updated July 17, 2001).
70 See Sanna Heikkinen, On the Service Provider Liability for Illegal Content, available
at http://www.tml.hut.fi/Studies/T- 110.501/2001/papers/sanna.heikkinen.pdf, at 9 (last visited
October 15, 2002); Paul O'Hare & Dean Stelfox, EU Copyright Directive: Halfway to
Harmony, CYBERSPACE LAW., July-Aug. 2002, at 9.
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quickly that they are imperceptible. As a practical matter, it is
difficult to understand how ISPs could manage the burden of
fulfilling such a requirement and thereby avoid liability. For one
thing, there are no national or international on-line databases
containing all the copyrighted material in the world that can be
checked to confirm copyright protection and authorizations." But,
even if there were such databases, it would be unreasonable for a
service provider to be expected to check the myriad of packets
passing through routers and cache servers against the database for
infringing material. For another thing, in the context of temporary
transmissions of small, digitized portions of a single work-as
opposed to the storage on a server of an entire work-it would be
administratively overwhelming, if not technically impossible, to
comply with demands by copyright owners that such temporary
transmissions be stopped or prevented.
An international agreement on copyright protection of individual
expressions in a digital arena has to be the solution. Even with no
additional treaty to deal with the Internet and with the protection of
intellectual property on-line, it is necessary for those who wish to
ensure protection throughout the world to find a way to bring all of
those countries that are not members of the Berne Convention or
other treaties into the mix. However, even reliance upon an
international copyright protection scheme will not resolve all the
problems of copyright infringement lurking on the Internet. As noted,
the Internet does not have physical boundaries. The combination of
fast-moving technology, the complexities of copyright law, and
policy-makers who are not familiar with those complexities, will
continue to place strains on copyright law and frustrate Internet users
now and in the future.
Nevertheless, seeking a flexible framework, balancing the
interests of all concerned parties and taking advantage of lessons
learned in the past, is a worthwhile endeavor. When evaluating the
optimal regulatory structure for electronic commerce and other
Internet activity, it may be helpful to analyze previous attempts to
harmonize regulations in a variety of subject areas, in addition to
examining previous efforts to impose regulatory structures upon the
Internet. The analysis below categorizes existing or proposed
international regulatory structures into four types: (1) unilateral
governmental efforts with far reaching effects; (2) attempts at global
or wide-spread regulatory structures; (3) efforts to harmonize among
71. CASEY, supra note 50, at 101.
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key players; and (4) self-regulation. The categories are discussed in
descending order of "external coercion," a phrase understood as
"control or influence by governments or other external actors." While
e-commerce businesses may reflexively seek to pursue the policy of
pure self-regulation, this analysis will question whether such a policy
is a realistic and workable solution and whether another one of the
categories might better serve such businesses in the long run.
The category of regulation described as unilateral governmental
actions represents a type of regulation that had been thought to be on
the wane. Increased liberalism in trade policies, advanced through
processes such as "rounds" of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade ("GATT") and institutions such as the newly-created World
Trade Organization ("WTO"), has, in the last 50 years, led to a
decrease in both tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade. One of the
principal reasons for this downward pressure is that, while
governments of individual states remain the ultimate sovereigns in the
international system, the increasing volume of cross-border trade has
made it possible for parties to avoid states with regulatory regimes
that were deemed too costly or restrictive.7 2 The interconnectedness
of the Internet throws a considerable wrench into any form of unitary
action-especially one based on border controls. The purchaser of
goods or services on the Internet, the provider of Internet access
services to that purchaser, the seller's principal place of business,
state of incorporation, web site hosting facility, and warehouse, may
all be located within different jurisdictions and no one jurisdiction
may be able to control activity taking place outside its borders. As a
result, significant questions have been raised about the application of
laws to the Internet, such as who may issue and enforce regulations
regarding Internet activity, where disputes may be resolved, and what
law applies to disputes.7 3 Attempts by businesses to comply with the
laws of every state or jurisdiction that could possibly be implicated in
conducting global electronic commerce would prove to be incredibly
costly.
74
One particularly troublesome example of the global effects of
unilateral actions is the November 20, 2000 ruling of a French judge,
72. See Gregory Shaffer, Globalization and Social Protection: The Impact of EU and
International Rules in Ratcheting up of U.S. Privacy Standards, 25 YALE J. INTL. L. 1,5 (2000).
73. See American Bar Association Cyberspace Law Committee, Achieving Legal and
Business Order in Cyberspace: A Report on Global Jurisdiction Issues Created by the Internet,
55 Bus. LAW. 1801, 1812 (2000). This report is the product of the American Bar Association
(ABA) Global Jurisdiction Project, empanelled in 1998 under the title, "Transnational Issues in
Cyberspace: A Project on the Law Relating to Jurisdiction."
74. See id. at 1813.
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holding that the U.S. Internet portal company Yahoo! must block
French users from viewing and purchasing Nazi memorabilia on its
U.S.-based auction web site or face a daily fine of 100,000 French
Francs (approximately $14,000). 7" Judge Jean-Jacques Gomez based
his ruling on an existing French law that prohibits the display of
objects that incite racial hatred. 6 The company had already removed
these items from its French-language and French-domain named
auction site, "http://fr.auctions.yahoo.com/," but not its U.S.-based
auction site "http://auctions.yahoo.com/. ' '77  The Judge received
advice from a panel of Internet experts regarding the ability of
filtering techniques to block French users from accessing the
78allegedly offensive content. Two of the three experts were Vint
Cerf, one of the founders of the Internet, and the current Chairman of
the Internet governing body, the Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers ("ICANN"); both expressed dismay about the
effects of the ruling.79 The implications for e-commerce jurisdiction
are significant, as businesses seeking to avoid regulation in a foreign
country may be forced not only to refrain from purposefully directing
prohibited content at nationals of the regulating country, but could
actually be required to install protective measures to prevent nationals
from a regulating country, even those speaking another language than
their native tongue, from accessing a site not specifically directed at
them. Cerf stated bluntly that the judge ignored the experts'
observation that "if every jurisdiction in the world insisted on some
75. See Vive la Liberte!, ECONOMIST, Nov. 23, 2000, available at
http://www.economist.com/business/displayStory.cfm?StoryID=434168; Keith Perine, Yahoo!
Asks U.S. Court to Rule French Court Out of Bounds, THE INDUSTRY STANDARD, Dec. 21,
2000, available at http://www.thestandard.com/article/display/0,1151,21026,00.html; John
Tagliabue, French Uphold Ruling Against Yahoo! On Nazi Sites, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2000, at
C8.
76. See Yahoo!s French Connection, ECONOMIST, Nov. 23, 2001, available at
htp://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?Story_ID-431328; Andy McCue, Caught Up in a
Legal Net, COMPUTING, Nov. 30, 2000, at 22.
77. See Lori Enos, Yahoo! Ordered to Bar French from Nazi Auctions, E-COMMERCE
TIMES, (Nov. 20, 2000), at http://www.ecommercetimes.com/news/articles2000/001120-4.shml;
see also Lisa Guernsy, Mainstream Sites Serve as Portals to Hate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2002,
at GI.
78. See Vive la Liberte!, supra note 75; Enos, supra note 77.
79. See Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), ICANN Board
of Directors Biographies, Vinton G. Cerf at http://www.cann.org/biog/cerf.htm (last updated
Nov. 1, 2000); Steffan Heuer, Chief of Protocol, INDUSTRY STANDARD, Jan. 15, 2001, available
at http://www.thestandard.com/article/display/0,1151,21386,00.html; Mark Ward, Experts
Question Yahoo! Auction Ruling, BBC NEWS, (Nov. 29, 2000), at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/sci/tech/newsid_1046000/1046548.stm; Tom Perrota, Cerf"
Yahoo! France Ruling is Flawed, INTERNET WORLD, Jan. 1, 2001.
2002]
18 COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19
form of filtering for its particular geographic territory, the world wide
web would stop functioning., 80  Several European businesspersons
immediately decried the judgment, suggesting that its effect would be
to embolden special interests seeking to regulate the Internet, to cause
businesses operating on the Internet to take their assets out of France,
and to promote a situation where Internet businesses might be subject
to the regulations of every country.8 ' Yahoo! responded to the French
court order by filing suit in U.S. District Court in San Jose,
California, asking for a declaratory judgment that the French court's
verdict violates the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and
provisions of the Communications Decency Act that immunize ISPs
from third party conduct, and that the French decision would be
unenforceable because it would be technically impossible for the
company to block French purchases of Nazi material.82 At about the
same time, Yahoo! announced that it would ban hate-related materials
from its U.S. web site, a decision which it claims is unrelated to the
French opinion, but one which would preserve its right to go forward
in U.S. courts while possibly providing a way of complying with the
effect of the French order. 83 Some commentators have suggested that
the success of the plaintiffs in the Yahoo! case of achieving much of
their desired result may embolden others to undertake similar suits in
foreign courts aiming to censor American on-line speech.84
In 2001, a federal district judge ruled that the French order
violated Yahoo!'s First Amendment rights and was therefore
unenforceable in the United States. 85  The French plaintiffs have
80. Ward, supra note 79.
81. See supra note 76; David Pringle, Some Worry France's Ruling on Yahoo! Will Work
to Deter Investments in Europe, WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 2000, available at
http://interaetive.wsj.com.
82. See Keith Perine, Yahoo! Asks U.S. Court to Rule French Court Out of Bounds,
INDUSTRY STANDARD, Dec. 21, 2000, available at
http:www.thestandard.com/article/display/0,1151,21026,00.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2002);
Yahoo! Tries to Block French Ruling, CYBERSPACE LAW, Feb. 2001, at 23; Yahoo! Seeks Ruling
That it Need Not Obey French Court Order, E-Business Law Bulletin, Feb. 2001, at 17.
83. See Kristi Essick, Yahoo Bans Nazi Goods, THE INDUSTRY STANDARD, Jan. 3, 2001,
at http://www.thestandard.com/article/display/0, 1151,21184,00.html; Lisa Guernsey, Yahoo to
Try Harder to Rid Postings of Hateful Material, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3,2001, at C2.
84. See Carl S. Kaplan, Experts See Online Speech Case as Bellwether, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
5, 2001, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001 / 01/05/technology/O5CYBERLAW.html;
Charlie Cray, The Enforcers: The Hague Convention and the Threat to Internet Freedoms and
Consumer Protection; Corporate Capture of the Internet, MULTINATIONAL MONITOR, Mar. 1,
2002, at 9.
85. Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Conre le Racisme et l'Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181
(N.D. Cal. 2001); Troy Wolverton, Court Shields Yahoo! From French Laws, CNET
NEWS.COM, (Nov. 8, 2001), at 85, at http://news.com.com/2102-1017-275564.html.
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appealed the case to the Ninth Circuit, but if the ruling stands, it will,
in the words of a Yahoo! lawyer, prevent Internet content operators
from having to operate in accordance with "a lowest common
denominator standard for protected speech on the Net.,8 6 In 2002, the
French courts responded, agreeing to try Yahoo!'s former CEO on
criminal charges of condoning war crimes, carrying the maximum
sentence for such a conviction of five years in prison and a $39,800
fine.87 The French court ruled that French law applied to Yahoo!'s
English-language sites even though they are based elsewhere.
Fears of further assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction may be
well-founded as German prosecutors began a criminal prosecution of
Yahoo! in 2000 for allegedly selling the forbidden book Mein Kampf
by Adolf Hitler, on Yahoo!'s auction site, to consumers in
Germany. 88  The criminal prosecution of Yahoo! in Germany was
subsequently dropped, and the German court noted that as a supplier
of internet services, Yahoo! was not responsible for the site's
content. s9 In India, a magistrate has found sufficient evidence of
violations of the country's pornography laws to begin a trial of
directors of a company whose on-line service allows users to find
other web sites, some of which may be pornographic, by means of a
search engine. 90 The complaint alleges that the company failed to
properly screen out pornographic material and allowed users to follow
hyperlinks to pornographic web sites, which are believed to be
located in the United States.
91
Another recent example of a unilateral action by a governmental
body having significant effects outside its borders is the EU Directive
86. Kaplan, supra note 84.
87. See Reuters, Yahoo Case Taken to Criminal Court, CNET NEWS.COM, (Feb. 26,
2002), available at http://news.com.com/2102-1023-856698.html; Steven Bonisteel, French
Court Picks 2003 Date for Yahoo!'s Nazi Trial, NEWSBYTES, May 7, 2002; Alan Krauss, Yahoo
Headed for Trial in France, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2002, at C2.
88. See Steve Gold, Germany Probes Yahoo Sale of "Mein Kampf', NEWSBYTES, Nov.
28, 2000, at http://www.newsbytes.com/news/00/158658.html; Thomas Vartanian & James
Munchmore, It is a Brave New World of On-Line Liabilities, N.Y. L.J., May 1, 2001, at 5; See
also Kurt A. Wimmer, Internet Jurisdiction, NAT'L L. J, March 26, 2001, at A12 (discussing
German court's exertion of jurisdiction over Australian in criminal suit against website
publisher).
89. See James Connell, Yahoo and Germany, INT'L HERALD TRIB., March 27, 2001, at
15.
90. See Mumbai, Porn Troubles Rediff Satyam, and Indiaworld, ZDNET INDIA,
(December 2, 2000), at http://www.zdnetindia.com/news/breaknews/stories/8591.html; R.
Savitha, India: Rediff Purveying Pornography, BUS. LINE, Nov. 30, 2000, at 2000 WL
30106706.
91. See Mumbai, supra note 90.
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95/46/EC on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the
Processing of Personal Data and the Free Movement of Such Data
("EU Privacy Directive"), which became effective on October 24,
1998.92 The EU Privacy Directive sets standards for transfers of
personal information within the EU, as well as for transfers to third
countries that are not members of the EU.93  The effect is to
significantly restrict businesses located in non-EU member states
from electronic commerce with states in the EU, if these non-EU
businesses do not meet the EU privacy standards. The United States
did not respond with a matching regulatory structure, but instead
negotiated a "safe-harbor" provision that still leaves most of the
burden on individual companies to comply with the EU Privacy
Directive's "adequacy" standard.94  The EU regulations have
significant effects on corporations, compelling them to establish
"principles" and "guidelines" to comply with the terms of the EU
Privacy Directive and possibly foregoing business opportunities that
they might otherwise take in the absence of such regulation.95 The
EU's action was the result of pressure from member states with
significant data protection laws, such as France, to prohibit transfers
of data to other member states, such as Italy, without such
protections. 96 As of July 2002, 220 American companies have self-
certified as falling within the safe harbor provisions.
97
In 2002, a German court ruled that deep linking-hypertext links
that bypass the front page of a Web site-to stories on a newspaper's
Web site violated the EU's 1996 Database Directive. 98  That
regulation prohibits the "unfair extraction" of materials contained in a
database. 99 The ruling reaches the opposite result from that of an
American court that looked at the same issue in 2000. In the U.S.
case, a federal district court ruled that hyperlinks do not, by
92. See Shaffer, supra note 72, at 5.
93. See id. at 3.
94. See id. at 24-28; See also U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, SAFE HARBOR OVERVIEW,
available at www.export.gov/safeharbor (last visited Oct. 14, 2002).
95. See id. at 72-74.
96. See id. at 10.
97. U.S. DEPT OF COMMERCE, SAFE HARBOR LIST, SAFE HARBOR, available at
http://web.ita.doc.gov/safeharbor/shlist.nsf/webPages/safe+harbor+list (last visited July 31,
2002).
98. Michelle Delio, Deep Linking Takes Another Blow, WIRED NEWS, (July 25, 2002), at
http://www.wired.com/news/pring/0,1294,54083,00.html; Marydee Ojala, Deep Thinking
Eludes Deep Linking Detractors, ONLINE MAG., Sept. 1, 2002, at 5; Foreign Courts Against
Deep Linking, THE QUILL, Sept. 1, 2002, at 8.
99. Database Directive 96/9/EC, 1996 O.J. (L 77).
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themselves, violate copyright laws.100 The judge analogized linking
to using a library's card index to refer to particular items.
Although the EU is a regional organization, with no jurisdiction
outside its member states, its rule-making action, conducted without
the significant participation of outside countries, has had significant
effects outside its boundaries. One effect of this unilateral action is to
allow disparate jurisdictions to create a fragmented patchwork of
regulation that would effectively allow any jurisdiction to attempt to
regulate the entire Internet. 10 This would reverse the criticism of
trade-liberalization as a "race to the bottom" and instead create an
environment that would cause global electronic commerce companies
to respond, inefficiently, to the highest common denominator of
regulation.
The establishment of a free trade regime where states voluntarily
submit to dispute settlement by the WTO would support the assertion
that one should not be overly concerned about the EU's Privacy
Directive. After all, states would then have the recourse against
significant non-tariff barriers to trade and significant alternative
markets in which to conduct commerce without submitting to
regulations such as those imposed by the EU. 10 2 One might expect
this resulting flight of potential commerce and investment capital to
provide an incentive for the EU to avoid such regulation. However,
because of the size of the EU economy, relative to the other
economies of the world, the opportunity for it to exert its influence in
international commerce, even if arguably contrary to its self-interest,
is a possibility that should concern other potentially affected states.' 
03
100. Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 1344, 1346 (C.D. Cal. 2000);
Michelle Finley, Attention Editors: Deep Link Away, WIRED NEWS, (Mar. 20, 2000), at
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,35306,00.html.
101. See Thomas P. Vartanian, Whose Internet is it Anyway? The Law of Jurisdiction in
Cyberspace: Achieving Legal Order Among the Nations, Presentation to the George Mason
University 2000 Global Internet Summit, March 13-14, 2000, available at
http://www.ffhsj.com/bancmail/jurover.htm; David Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-
The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1307 (1996).
102. See WTO, Trading Into the Future: Introduction to the WTO, The Agreements, at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/whatis e/tif e/agrm0_e.htm (last modified Sep. 24,
2001); See WTO, Trading Into the Future: The Organization, Members and Observers, at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatis e/tif e/org6 e.htm (last modified Oct. 2, 2002).
103. See European Union, Delegation of the European Commission to the United States,
Facts and Figures on the European Union and United States, at
http://www.eurunion.org/profile/facts.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2002) (the EU claims that in
2000 its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was $7.84 Trillion compared with a United States 2000
GDP of $9.9 Trillion); See also, European Report, FBE Alludes to Return of Parity Between
Euro and the Dollar, Dec. 2000 (discussing the growing strength of the European economy and
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An example of the negative consequences resulting from the
imposition of unilateral regulations is represented in the "Brussels
Regulation" or "Brussels 1" regulation. This provision, which
European Justice Ministers signed November 30, 2000, would allow
European consumers who order goods or services over the Internet
from a business in another EU country to sue that business in the
consumer's home country. 10 4 Supporters of the regulation hailed it as
a measure that would increase consumers' confidence in e-commerce
because they would be protected by the same consumer protection
laws that are applicable when shopping off-line.'0 5 Representatives
from various business interests were harshly critical of the measure
though, suggesting that on-line merchants may purposefully avoid EU
countries and observed that such regulation may fragment the EU's
common market.' 0 6 Some European organizations are "furious" with
the apparent inconsistencies between the Brussels 1 Regulation10 7 and
the EU E-Commerce Directive. 10 8  The controversy over this
jurisdictional regulation could also foreshadow similar opposition to
an initiative to update the Rome Convention on choice of law to apply
to e-commerce disputes.
10 9
Some unilateral actions by foreign governments complement on-
going efforts by the U.S. government. Congress considered an anti-
spain bill in 2002 that would have imposed criminal penalties for the
transmission of unsolicited commercial e-mail that contained false or
misleading header information." 0 The bill also required spammers to
include identifying, opt-out, and physical address information in any
the Euro).
104. See Brandon Mitchener, EU Approves E-Commerce Law, Prompting Concerns Over
Impact, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 2000, available at
http://interactive.wsj.com/articIes/SB975616575701214705.htm; Europe: Business Attacks EU
Websites Move, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2000, available at http://www.ft.com; Paul Meller, Online
Buyers Gain Ability to Sue, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2000, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/01/technology/O1NET.html; Keith Regan, EU Oks E-
Commerce Dispute Law, E-COMMERCE TIMES, (Dec. 1, 2000), at
http://www.ecommercetimes.com/perl/story/5635.html; Victorya Hong, 'Brussels 1" Angers EC
Businesses, INDUSTRY STANDARD, Dec. 1, 2000, at
http://www.thestandard.com/article/display/0, 1151,20531,00.html.
105. See Meller, supra note 104.
106. See id
107. Council Directive 2001/44/EC, 2001 O.J. (L 175), available at
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2001/1_17520010628en00 1 70020.pdf.
108. See Hong, supra note 104.
109. Id.
110. See Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of
2001, S. 630, 107h Cong. (2001) (a Senate committee reported the bill favorably on May 17,
2002).
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unsolicited commercial e-mail. While the FTC or state attorneys
general could bring claims on behalf of the public, the bill would also
permit an ISP to file a civil action and to recover treble damages for
harm caused to its network. Opponents of strong anti-spam
legislation include corporations such as Citicorp and Procter &
Gamble, as well as commercial associations such as the National
Retail Federation and the American Insurance Association, who argue
that the bills would restrict e-mail marketing and disadvantage
electronic commerce.Il' Although many states have their own anti-
spam laws, these measures suffer from difficulties in coverage,
enforcement, and jurisdiction, increasing the significance of federal
action.112 The European Union approved an anti-spam directive in
2002 that establishes a default opt-in rule, meaning that consumers
must give permission to marketers before being sent commercial e-
mail. 113
The opposite of unilateral actions are global or near-consensus
agreements that take into account a multitude of views. One of the
problems with such consensus mechanisms is that often in areas such
as content regulation, intellectual property protection, privacy and
security, where several parties may have very different interests; it is
exceptionally difficult to develop principles agreed to by all.
Additionally, even if the parties can agree on the rules that are to
govern a given regime, constructing an enforcement mechanism that
is binding on international parties and accepted by domestic
governments has been one of the most significant challenges in
international relations. One example of the difficulty in reaching
consensus is in the area of copyright protection. The Convention for
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works ("Berne Convention"),
signed in Berne, Switzerland on September 9, 1886, represented an
early attempt to create an international regime for copyright
protection. 114  However, the rigid adherence of the U.S. to the
111. See Letter from Securities Industry Association on Behalf of Multiple Industry
Associations of May 15, 2002 to Sen. Ernest F. Hollings, Chairman of the Senate Commerce,
Science and Transportation Committee [hereinafter "Letter from Securities Industry
Association"] available at http://www.sia.com/2002_commentletters/pdf/AntiSpam.pdf, See
generally Jennifer Lee, Spam: An Escalating Attack of the Clones, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2002,
at GI.
112. See Letter from Securities Industry Association, supra note I11.
113. See Directive 2002/58/EC, 2002 O.J. (L 201); Christopher Saunders, EU Oks Spam
Ban, Online Privacy Rules, INTERNETNEWS.COM, (May 31, 2002), available at
http://www.intemetnews.com/IAR/print.php/I 154391.
114. MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 17.01 [B][1]
(2000); CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 21 (Matthew Bender & Co. ed. 5 heds. 2000).
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requirement of copyright notice, specifically the use of the ©, or
"circle C" symbol, prevented the country from joining the Berne
Convention for over 102 years. 15 Several of the functions of the
Berne Convention were carried out through the Universal Copyright
Convention (which the U.S. joined in 1955) and through the
"backdoor to Berne" access, and ultimately the United States did join
the Berne Convention and the 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty.
Nevertheless, the example of Berne demonstrates the difficulties with
relying on multilateral agreements to establish order. 16 An example
of intractable differences that would prohibit certain agreements is
"content regulation," what many Americans derisively refer to as
"censorship." While multiple jurisdictions may agree on the
criminality of certain forms of expression on the Internet, such as
child pornography, the Yahoo! dispute demonstrates how differing
domestic laws can make agreement impossible. In France, the
prevention of racial hatred takes precedence over unrestrained speech,
whereas in the U.S. the First Amendment of the Constitution prohibits
Congress from making such a choice."
7
Although obtaining the consensus required to conclude
international agreements has proven difficult, once achieved, the
agreements have significantly contributed to the creation of regimes
that facilitate order.1 8 After adoption by the U.S. and a total of over
140 countries, the Berne Convention ultimately has progressed
towards the goal of "universalizing" copyright law through the
establishment of "minimum standards" with which countries adhering
to the treaty comply in their domestic law. 119 The treaties push
countries toward consistency of treatment by including a requirement
for "national treatment," which gives nationals the same protection in
other countries that they receive in their own country.'
20
Achieving effective enforcement of international treaties has
been consistently hampered by the failure to obtain the consent of
sovereign states to such agreements that are binding upon them. Two
notable examples from U.S. history are the failure to ratify the League
of Nations Treaty and the withdrawal of the U.S. from compulsory
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") following
115. JOYCE ET AL., supra note 114, at 21.
116. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 114, at §§ 17.01 [B][1]-[2], [C][1][b]; JOYCE, ET
AL., supra note 114, at 33-34.
117. See Yahoo, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et l'Antisemitisme, supra note 86;
Yahoo! 's French Connection, supra note 77.
118. SeeNIMMER&NIMMER, supra note 114, at § 17.01[B].
119. Id. at § 17.01[B][l][a].
120. See id.
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United States v. Nicaragua (Nicaraguan Harbors).12 1  The recent
creation of an intellectual property regime following the Uruguay
Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT")
increases prospects for an enhanced enforcement regime for
intellectual property, beyond that of previous treaties dealing with
intellectual property. The protocol on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPs") provides a method for
enforcement in addition to national treatment and minimum
standards, and use of a WTO adjudicatory panel. 122  Possible
sanctions authorized under the WTO's Dispute Settlement
Understanding ("DSU") include retaliatory sanctions, e.g., cross-
sector sanctions against an area other than intellectual property. 1
23
Given the problems of unilateral action and the difficulties of
multilateral agreements, much greater emphasis has been placed on
the "harmonization" of electronic commerce laws by developing
model codes or uniform laws that would be enacted in multiple
jurisdictions. One of the current efforts to do this is through the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
("UNCITRAL") Model Law on Electronic Commerce ("Model
Law"). 124 The Model Law does not seek to become a detailed "code"
that would specify every rule applying to electronic commerce, but
instead, attempts to provide general principles and procedures from
which states may draw their own codes tailored to their individual
circumstances and preferences. 25 The ultimate goal of such an effort
is to give to electronic transactions similar treatment as that received
by paper-based communications.126  An additional example of a
consensus agreement that articulates only broad principles and
guidelines is the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development's ("OECD") Recommendation of the Council
concerning Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and
Transborder Flows of Personal Data ("OECD Guidelines"). 127 This
121. Military And Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.) 1986 I.C.J. 14, 25 I.L.M. 1023
(merits); U.S. Statement on the U.S. Withdrawal from the Proceedings Initiated by Nicaragua in
the International Court Of Justice, 24 I.L.M. 246, January 18, 1985; See also Military And
Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 24 I.L.M. 59 (1985) (jurisdiction).
122. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 114, at §§ 18.06, 18.06 [B][2]-[B][3].
123. See id. at § 18.06[B][3].
124. See UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce with Guide to Enactment
(May 2000), available at http://www.uncitral.org/en-index.htm.
125. See A. Brooke Overby, Will Cyberlaw be Uniform? An Introduction to the
UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce, 7 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 219, 222 (1999).
126. See id.
127. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Guidelines
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farsighted document articulates general principles that one might use
in constructing privacy regulations. It has been cited as an influence
in the development of privacy regulations in member countries, yet it
has no binding authority on any OECD member.
128
Technological developments will also affect the legal battles
over applying national laws worldwide. "Geographical zoning"
software has the potential to determine an Internet user's physical
location, so that Web sites can block or limit the content accessible
according to local laws. 29 Widespread use of such technology would
force ISPs to reevaluate their policies for access and their roles in
acting as "mere conduits" for information.
The creation of the UNCITRAL Model Law may be compared
and contrasted with the attempts in the United States to update the
Universal Commercial Code ("UCC") to address electronic
commerce and electronic data transmission. 130 The UCC has
heretofore been considered a successful uniform code, having been
implemented in some form in every state of the United States.13' The
Uniform Computer Information Transaction Act ("UCITA") began as
an attempt to create a UCC Article 2B that would specifically address
choice of law and contract issues relating to digital information or
digitally delivered services. 32  UCITA has been embroiled in
controversy regarding standard form contracts and mass-market
licenses as well as the lack of certain consumer protections. 33 As of
August 2002, UCITA had only been adopted by two states, Maryland
and Virginia.' 34  Some commentators suggest that the UNCITRAL
Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, available at
http://www.olis.oecd.org/horizontal/oecdacts.nsf/linkto/C(80)58 (last visited Aug. 1, 2002); See
also Barbara Cruthcfield George, Patricia Lynch, & Susan Marsnik, U.S. Multinational
Employers: Navigating Through the "Safe Harbor" Principles to Comply with the EU Data
Privacy Directive, 38 AM. Bus. L.J. 735 (2001) (providing a general background of the OECD
Guidelines).
128. See e.g. .Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Privacy Online: Fair Information
Practices in the Electronic Marketplace, A Report to Congress 4, 43 n.25, (May 2000),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy2000/privacy2000.pdf.
129. Lisa Guernsey, Welcome to the Web. Passport Please?, NYTIMES, Mar. 15, 2001, at
G1.
130. See Overby, supra note 125, at 227.
131. Id. at 228.
132. See Raymond T. Nimmer, Contract Law in Electronic Commerce, 587 PLLI/PAT 1127,
1142 (2000).
133. See Raymond T. Nimmer, UCITA: A Commercial Contract Code, 17 NO. 5
COMPUTER LAW. 3, 12-15 (2000).
134. See National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, A Few Facts
About the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, available at
http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/uniformactfactsheets/uniformacts-fs-ucita.asp, (last visited Oct.
17, 2002). Maryland and Virginia adopted non-uniform versions of UCITA in 2000, and
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process, which is more flexible than that of the UCC and minimizes
intrusion into domestic law, will be more successful than UCITA.'35
However, the experience of the United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea (which was hindered for several years by the
persistent efforts of developing nations to affect a wealth
redistribution system concerning the mining of mineral nodules from
the seafloor) is suggestive of the difficulties to be encountered in
enacting regulations at a global level.
136
In addition to harmonization efforts that aspire to global
application, such as UNCITRAL, another approach to creating
governance structures is to begin with an agreement between a small
number of key actors, then slowly build consensus. This approach
was implemented with significant success in the establishment of
capital adequacy standards for international banks in a framework
commonly known as the "Basle Accord."'137 The Basle Accord began
as a bilateral agreement between the United States and United
Kingdom and expanded to include the Group of Ten ("G-10")
countries. 138  However, because the Basle Accord has limited its
membership to the G-10, it has been able to better reflect the interests
of the primary banking institutions and to avoid becoming sidetracked
by the concerns of minor banking players. An electronic commerce
agreement forged between the G-10 countries would similarly be able
to focus on the concerns of the most significant countries involved in
electronic commerce. However, countries excluded from the process
would likely protest their lack of input. One solution to this problem
would be to specify a minimum volume of electronic commerce to
become a participant in such a regime. That way, small countries
with a significant amount of e-commerce activity would not be
legislation has been introduced in seven other states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S.
Virgin Islands. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws continues
to consider amendments to UCITA. In 2001, the attorneys general of thirty-two states sent a
letter to NCCUSL expressing continued opposition to UCITA as "fundamentally flawed in its
scope and approach." Id.
135. See Overby, supra note 125, at 234.
136. See NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, LAW OF THE SEA: THE END GAME, 3-7
(1996).
137. See Wolfgang H. Reinicke, GLOBAL PUBLIC POLICY: GOVERNING WITHOUT
GOVERNMENT? 103 (1998).
138. See Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, International Convergence of Capital
Measurement and Capital Standards, (July 1998), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs04a.htm; See generally, Lawrence Lee, The Basle Accords as Soft
Law: Strengthening Int"l Banking Supervision, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (1998).
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excluded on non-relevant factors such as population or geographic
size.
One regulatory structure that has worked very effectively in an
environment of decentralization and complexity that is similar to that
of electronic commerce is the one found in the domestic regulation of
securities: self-regulation with government supervision. In the United
States, much of the regulation of securities markets is conducted by
industry-created self regulatory organizations ("SROs"), including the
National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD") and the New
York Stock Exchange ("NYSE"), which are themselves overseen by
the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"). 139 Imposition of
such a regulatory structure for e-commerce would likely involve the
creation of industry-sponsored self-regulatory organizations to
regulate privacy issues and consumer fraud concerns, with oversight
provided by an existing federal body such as the U.S. Federal Trade
Commission, which has shown that it is not afraid to get involved in
policing electronic commerce.
1 40
The evolution of the Basle Accord has also begun to fit into this
model, with rigid rules on capital levels being replaced by models that
allow self-assessment of risk and reward effective self-analysis with
reduced stringency of regulation. 141  This evolution of the Basle
Accord was an innovative industry response to what began as a more
rigid regulatory regime. Electronic commerce companies may be
able to implement such a strategy if they find themselves under
inflexible laws and regulations where industry self-regulation offers a
more effective alternative that is acceptable to regulators.
Pure self-regulation reflects the current state of supervision in
many areas of electronic commerce, such as privacy. However, there
are several reasons to suggest that this framework either may not last,
or may not be the optimal environment for businesses attempting to
conduct electronic commerce. The governmental efforts to regulate
electronic commerce, including the EU Privacy Directive,
UNCITRAL, and UCITA, discussed above, as well as other actions,
such as the U.S. Children's' Online Privacy Protection Act
("COPPA"), suggest that belief in the continued existence of self-
139. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION, 1-19 (3d ed. 1996).
140. See Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Going, Going, Gone: Law Enforcement
Efforts To Combat Internet Auction Fraud, (February 2000), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/reports/int-auction.pdf See FCC Instant Messaging Compromise Draws
Criticism, WASH. INTERNET DAILY, Jan. 16, 2001.
141. Remarks at the Conference on Credit Risk Modeling and Regulatory Implications
Sept. 22, 1998, at http://www.newyorkfed.org/pihome/news/speeches/mcd980922.html; Lee,
supra note 138.
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regulation may simply be an unrealistic expectation in many areas of
electronic commerce. Congress, which once chanted the mantra
"we're not going to regulate the Internet," has changed its tune and
proposed and implemented a whole slew of new invasive
regulations.1 42  Additionally, doubts can be raised about the
effectiveness of industry self-regulation. The case of Toysmart.com,
which attempted, as part of its bankruptcy proceeding, to sell its
customer lists in violation of its own privacy policy, suggests some of
the ways that self-regulation can break down. 43 A cause of particular
dismay for advocates of self-regulation was the failure of third party
certification agency TRUSTe to stop one of its licensees from
violating their agreement.144
Such breakdowns in self-control are important to electronic
commerce participants who may suffer reputation harm by being
associated with merchants who are perceived as lacking credibility
with respect to their willingness to adhere to privacy or security
policies. 145  The resulting loss of confidence creates an electronic
commerce marketplace where efficient transactions are foregone, due
to lack of certainty about privacy and security issues. 146  Adopting
policies and procedures that raise the confidence of participants in
electronic commerce may lead to the creation of markets that promote
more transactions than they inhibit, creating greater wealth for all e-
commerce participants.
142. See Children's Online Privacy Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681
(1998). See Associated Press, Congress Mulls Internet Filtering, CNET NEWS.COM, (Oct. 15,
2000), available at http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-3204667.html. See Steve Chapman,
It's Librarians to the Rescue on Net Speech, THE BALTIMORE SUN, June 11, 2002, at A19.
143. See Federal Trade Commission (FTC), FTC Announces Settlement With Bankrupt
Website, Toysmart.com, Regarding Alleged Privacy Policy Violations, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/07/toysmart2.htm (July 21, 2000); Federal Trade Commission v.
Toysmart.com, LLC, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21963 (2000).
144. Id.
145. See AT&T Labs, Beyond Concern: Understanding Net Users' Attitudes about Online
Privacy, Research Technical Report TR.99.4.3, April 14, 1999, available at
http://www.research.att.com/resources/trs/TRs/99/99.4/99.4.3/report.htm; Better Business
Bureau Online, Benefits of Membership, at http://www.bbbonline.org/reliability/benefits.asp
(last visited Aug. 1, 2002).
146. United States Judiciary Committee, Know The Rules Use the Tools: Privacy In The
Digital Age: A Resource For Internet Users, available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/oldsite/privacy.pdf (last visited Aug. 1, 2002); Reuters, Poll Says
Most Americans Have Cyber-Security Qualms, INFOWORLD, (Oct. 16, 2000), at
http://www.infoworldcom/articles/hn/xml/00/l 0/16/001016hnamericans.xml.
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V. CRIMINAL LIABILITY
There are national economies great and small, and there are
vastly different cultural views from country to country, all of which
affect and compound problems associated with Internet content and
electronic commerce activity. But two things found in common
among every township and village the world over are the propensity
of some people to commit crimes, and the inclination of local
authorities to enact and enforce consumer protection laws. They
come in a variety of shapes and colors, but they're all cut of
essentially the same cloth.
No discussion of the problems facing ISPs and e-commerce
companies is complete without assessing the risk of criminal liability
for the acts of others and the possibility of running afoul of local
consumer protection laws.
As a general matter, issues of criminal liability often turn on the
fact that what may be perfectly legal in one place is criminal in
another. As a related matter, who may be held responsible for
criminal activity varies as well; in the courts of some countries, a
disinclination to hold ISPs criminally liable for the acts of their
customers is strongly emerging, while in other countries, the opposite
is true. On the enforcement side, efforts are increasing to coordinate
criminal investigative activities. Officials from the Group of Eight
("G-8") countries announced an effort to seek common law
enforcement standards for the Internet.1 47  The officials' proposal
included a call for the establishment of a central office to coordinate
the investigation of on-line criminal activity.1 48  While the
sensibilities of courts may vary widely, one thing is clear: law
enforcement authorities are less ambivalent. Police and government
investigators around the world speak in a common voice in calling for
regulation of Internet activity, including increased access to ISP
networks. 149
The prospect of liability for "crimes" that constitute normal,
even honorable (e.g., free speech) behavior in an ISP's or e-
commerce company's home country may seem anathema. The
147. See G-8 Officials Seek Common Standards against Internet Crime, at
http://www.it.fairfax.com.au/breaking/20001027/A10781-2000Oct27.html (last visited Nov.4,
2000); Ralph Atkins & Tobias Buck, G-8 Seeks Tighter Internet Security, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 27,
2000, at 16.
14R. Id-
149. The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation has consistently sought and promoted
policies and legislation expanding its access to communications and transactions on the Internet
and other networks.
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service provider's instinct may be to speak out against any potential
imposition of liability, contemptuously ignoring the threat; or attempt
to avoid the problem, to the extent possible, by not doing business in
such a country. As we have seen with respect to civil liability for
copyright infringement however, there may be administratively and
economically palatable solutions to avoiding or complying with
onerous laws that exploit markets, which would otherwise be lost.
The prospect of being subject to local consumer protection laws
is a particularly vexing problem for e-commerce companies.
Inexpensive access to the Internet and the decreasing cost of
providing rich content and services has lowered barriers of entry to
global markets. At the same time, buyers can now conduct business
with sellers who cannot afford to defend themselves when disputes
arise that subject them to the consumer protection laws-and the
courts--of the buyer's locale. Traditionally, the disparity of
resources in favor of sellers almost always justified subjecting sellers
to the jurisdiction of buyers for purposes of resolving disputes or
defending against claims brought by consumer protection authorities.
The parties to an e-commerce transaction however, may be similarly
situated; that is, the seller may have no resource advantage over the
buyer.
As such, e-commerce companies that target--or at least do not
attempt to exclude-buyers in foreign states must carefully weigh the
risks of being subject to multiple jurisdictions. As a practical matter,
this may entail absorbing losses associated with customer complaints
and enduring default judgments on claims brought by consumer
protection authorities. 50 While such judgments are undesirable from
a business perspective (e.g., reputation damage),151 it is important to
remember that the same factors that inhibit an on-line seller from
defending itself in the first place, limit the effect (i.e. enforcement) of
a judgment as a practical matter; namely, no physical contacts with,
or assets in, the jurisdiction.
150. The same interactive technology and innovative business methods that foster a
comfortable and engaging forum for e-commerce transactions may provide opportunities to
avoid the long arm of consumer protection authorities. To the extent that buyers, or consumers,
have traditionally been viewed as un-empowered as compared to most sellers, e-commerce site
operators may seek to dispel that notion by empowering consumers and customers with dynamic
disclosures, user-friendly, easy to navigate terms and conditions and other methods.
151. Consumer-friendly e-commerce sites may also realize a competitive advantage by
building a reputation that ia as sensitive to consumer protection issues (i.e. the best interests of
its customers), just as some bricks-and-mortar businesses have established reputations for
superior customer service.
2002]
32 COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 19
Like criminal law enforcement, consumer protection officials
have begun coordinating efforts with colleagues around the world. In
late 2000, The U.S. Federal Trade Commission hosted a meeting of
consumer protection authorities from nine countries, five U.S.
administrative agencies, and twenty-three U.S. states.1 52  It is
reasonable to assume that the same rationale that led the guardians of
intellectual property rights and criminal investigative authorities to
ISPs, will lead to calls from consumer protection officials for help in
reducing on-line fraud and other nefarious business practices. To the
extent that ISPs may be subject to liability for the shady dealings of
their customers, the need for predictability will require a harmonized
approach to imposing-including limiting-such liability. In the
context of consumer protection, there has been significant effort
around the world to promote the use of on-line dispute resolution
services to bring together remote parties to a dispute in a fast and
economical manner. It may be possible to extend such efficiencies to
consumer protection authorities and to the subjects of their claims, in
some cases.
VI. A CLOSER LOOK AT THE BALANCED APPROACH OF NOTICE AND
TAKEDOWN
While no one regulatory policy model will effectively allow
governments to control every type of content or activity on the
Internet, there is at least one model that shows great promise and
should be considered as the foundation for a harmonized approach to
global content/activity regulation. This model, called "Notice and
Take Down," has two major components: (1) limited immunization
from damages, when certain conditions have been met, wherever an
involved party lacks control over the content/activity involved; and
(2) limited damages (e.g., only injunctive relief), when certain
conditions are met, wherever a party has the right and ability to
control content/activity but is not the originator of such
content/activity, and complies within a reasonable period of time to
an adequate notice (or in response to an appropriate knowledge
standard) to block or remove such contact/activity.153  If
content/activity is removed by mistake, a process exists for having it
returned. Removing third parties from the dispute is only a process
for dealing with illegal control/activity once it has been appropriately
152. Law Enforcers Target "Top 10" Online Scams, at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/1 0/topten.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2002).
153. See CASEY, supra note 50, at 103-104; 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000).
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identified, and is completely unaffected by the nature of
content/activity being so regulated.
The Conference Report on the DMCA cites two purposes of
Title 11. 54  The first is preserving "strong incentives for service
providers and copyright owners to cooperate to detect and deal with
copyright infringements that take place in the digital networked
environment. 1 55  Simultaneously, the law is designed to provide
"greater certainty to service providers concerning their legal exposure
for infringements that may occur in the course of their activities. ' 56
This law adds a new section (§ 512) to the Copyright Act, 57 limiting
the liability of service providers arising from four activities: transitory
digital network communications, system caching, information
residing on systems or networks at direction of users, and information
location tools (e.g., hyperlinks, on-line directories and search
engines). 58  The provisions entitle qualified service providers to a
complete bar on monetary damages. 159 In addition, Title II restricts
the availability of injunctive or other equitable relief. 60 In order to be
entitled to these "safe harbor" protections, a party must qualify as a
"service provider" under §§ 512(k)(1)(A) and (B), and meet several
conditions. 6 ' A service provider must designate with the Copyright
Office an agent that will receive DMCA notifications.162 The service
provider must develop a procedure for processing DMCA
notifications and for filing that information on its website.163  With
regard to information residing on systems or networks at the direction
of users and information location tools, the service provider cannot
have actual knowledge of the infringing content, or be aware of facts
or circumstances from which infringement is apparent1 64 If the
154. See 144 CONG. REC. 10,048, 10,067 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1998).
155. See id. at 10,067.
156. See id.
157. Codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512.
158. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 512 (a)-(d) (2000); United States Library of Congress, Copyright
Office, Digital Millennium Copyright Act: U.S. Copyright Office Summary, 8 & 12, Dec. 1998,
available at http://www.loc.gov/copyright/legislation/dmca.pdf [hereinafter "Copyright Office
Summary"].
159. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 512 (a)-(d),(j); See Copyright Office Summary, supra note 158, at
9.
160. See Copyright Office Summary, supra note 158, at 9.
161. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 512 (k)(I)(A),(B); CASEY, supra note 50, at 158-159.
162. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (c)(2); CASEY, supra note 50, at 158.
163. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 512 (c)(2), 512 (i); CASEY, supra note 50, at 158.
164. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 512 (c)(l)(A)(i)-(ii), (d)(1)(A)-(B); CASEY, supra note 50, at 158-
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service provider obtains knowledge or awareness, it must act
expeditiously to remove or disable access to such material.'65 In
addition, the service provider cannot receive any financial benefit
directly attributable to the infringing activity in a situation where the
service provider has the right and ability to control such activity.'
66
Title II also creates a procedure by which a copyright owner may
request a federal court to issue a subpoena to a service provider in
order to identify an alleged infringer.' 67  However, the statute
specifically states that it does not condition the availability of the safe
harbor provisions on the service provider monitoring its services or
affirmatively searching for infringing activity.168 The protections also
cannot be conditioned on the service provider gaining access to,
removing, or disabling access to material in cases in which such
conduct is prohibited by law.
169
A notice and takedown procedure is also applied in Section 4 of
the EU E-Commerce Directive. 170  Service providers are provided
with limited liability in the conduct of caching and hosting activities
and when acting as a "mere conduit."' 7' The preamble to the E-
Commerce Directive states that the liability limitations are necessary
to eliminate disparities between member states regarding the liability
of service providers and to develop "rapid and reliable procedures for
removing and disabling access to illegal information."' 72  The
preamble suggests that this arrangement "strikes a balance between
the different interests at stake and establishes principles upon which
industry standards can be based.' ' 173  As in the DMCA, service
providers that obtain actual knowledge or awareness of illegal
activities have to act expeditiously to remove or disable access to the
information.174  The E-Commerce Directive does not preclude the
imposition of injunctions by courts and administrative authorities to
remove or disable information deemed to be illegal. 75 Although the
E-Commerce Directive seeks greater uniformity in the imposition of
liability to service providers and precludes general monitoring
165. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 512(c)(1)(A)(iii), (d)(1)(C); CASEY, supra note 50, at 159.
166. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 512(c)(1)(A)(iii), (d)(2); CASEY, supra note 50, at 159.
167. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(h); Copyright Office Summary, supra note 158, at 9.
168. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(m); Copyright Office Summary, supra note 158, at 9.
169. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(m); Copyright Office Summary, supra note 158, at 9.
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requirements, it gives EU member states the authority to require
monitoring in specific cases and when ordered by national authorities
in accordance with national legislation.176  Additionally, the E-
Commerce Directive does not prevent member states from applying,
under national law, duties of care to service providers who host
information provided by recipients of their service, in order to detect
and prevent certain illegal activities. 
177
Jurisdiction remains the biggest obstacle to the effective
functioning of an international notice and takedown regime. The
barriers to enforcement and adjudication created by jurisdictional
difficulties could allow parties to ignore notice and take down orders
("NTO"), or they could promote the development of multilateral
treaties that would cause NTO orders to be respected internationally.
One form of multilateral treaty arrangement that may be effective is
to allow countries to pass and enforce domestic controls within their
own countries, but to limit extraterritorial enforcement until a
specified percentage of countries had agreed to that control.
Ultimately, the country with the lowest controls could become
the economic power of the 2 1st century, as users and companies
servicing such users flock to the most reasonable and economically
satisfying system of regulation.
VII. CONCLUSION
Internet service providers facilitating global electronic
commerce by bringing together buyers and sellers typically have no
knowledge of or control over the activities of their customers.
Nonetheless, in an era of 1) rock-bottom barriers to market entry, 2)
virtually no relationship between the cost of reaching a customer and
the physical distance from buyer to seller, and 3) potential anonymity
of Internet users, ISPs are in a unique position to assist law
enforcement officials in safeguarding the public welfare and rights
holders in protecting their valuable interests. Irrespective of the
equity of holding ISPs responsible for the actions of their customers,
they have been and will continue to be called upon to aid in
controlling content and activity on the Internet. As a practical matter,
this has resulted in the imposition of liability for the acts of third party
customers or, in the case of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act,
176. See Council Directive 2000/31/EC, 2000 0. (L 178) 12-13.
177. Id.
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limitations on liability in exchange for assisting rights holders in their
efforts to preserve their economic interests.
In order to foster the business certainty that service providers-
from ISPs to e-commerce companies-require, in order to continue
investing in infrastructure and services, a harmonized or uniform
approach must be taken to the imposition of liability, including setting
out qualified limitations on liability. Setting the ground rules, while
relying on service providers to design, implement and manage the
processes to comply with those rules, will lay a solid foundation on
which to build a globally-networked economy fueled by electronic
commerce activity.
